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A B S T R A C T
Many countries have implemented laws and planning instruments to preserve farmland on the urban fringe. This
paper aims at a better understanding of the governance changes in peri-urban farmland protection following
decentralisation processes in France and Italy. We compare the implementation of farmland protection instru-
ments in the two city regions of Montpellier and Rome. From a governance perspective, we highlight the
practical issues of eﬀectiveness and social acceptability arising from power devolution, diﬀerent forms of gov-
ernance, and the potential conﬂicts when planning control shifts to lower-than-regional bodies.
Our analysis is based on qualitative methods Primary data were collected through document analysis, par-
ticipant observation and in-depth interviews aimed at understanding local stakeholders’ practices and points of
view on access to farmland, housing and building rights.
We ﬁnd that around Rome and Montpellier, decentralisation has produced multiple decision-making authorities
and increased the complexity of procedures. Despite more regulatory constraints in agricultural areas, farmland
conversion has persisted. However, decentralisation processes have also changed ways of governing and favoured
local alternative initiatives for farmland protection and farming development on the urban fringe. New modes of
governance involve public local authorities, farmers’ representative bodies (Montpellier) and civil society organisa-
tions (Rome). In both cities, they have a positive but limited impact on the eﬀectiveness of farmland protection
instruments. Their social acceptability varies, depending on who is really included in the participation process.
1. Introduction
Urbanisation is a global phenomenon with major implications for
croplands worldwide (Bren d’Amour et al., 2016). Since the 1990s, a
growing body of scientiﬁc literature has examined the urban conversion
of farmland (Bryant and Johnston, 1992; Nelson, 1992) and its impacts
on landscape, environment, and food security (Johnson, 2001;
Plieninger et al., 2016). Many countries have accordingly implemented
laws and planning instruments to preserve farmland on the urban fringe
(Alterman, 1997; Bengston et al., 2004; Daniels and Lapping 2005).
These studies identify various obstacles to eﬀective farmland protec-
tion. Tan et al. (2009) in particular compare how national governance
structures impact farmland conversion in the Netherlands, Germany,
and China. They highlight major diﬀerences related to land ownership,
land use planning, the role of the market and the role of government.
However, they conclude that it is very diﬃcult to assess and compare
the performance of individual governance structures, each embedded in
its local context. They therefore promote the “comparative study of
institutional change stories” (p.973).
Our objective is, thus, to contribute to a better understanding of
governance changes in peri-urban farmland protection following de-
centralisation by comparing the situation in France and Italy. These two
nations have private property regimes with some use constraints
(Jacobs, 2008). Since the 1970s, they have undergone a process of
decentralisation that has aﬀected the governance of land use planning
decisions. In both countries, the land use planning system is based on
binding zoning plans drawn up at municipal level. Their models of
decentralisation, however, diﬀer: France has a centralised tradition and
Italy a tradition of local autonomy.
To shed light on the inﬂuence of such decentralised governance
structure on agricultural land use planning, we compare the im-
plementation of farmland protection instruments in the two city regions
of Montpellier (France) and Rome (Italy). From a governance per-
spective, we aim to highlight the practical issues arising from power
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devolution, diﬀerent forms of governance, and the potential conﬂicts
when planning control shifts to lower-than-regional bodies.
Does the devolution of powers lead to diﬀerent forms of governance
of farmland protection? Do these governance forms aﬀect the eﬀec-
tiveness and social acceptability of farmland protection instruments?
In what follows, we ﬁrst explain our conceptual and analytical
frameworks. Then, we provide an overview of our case studies and
methods, and we compare land use planning systems in France and in
Italy. In the results section, we focus on local practices to explain how
peri-urban farmland protection has been implemented around Rome
and Montpellier. Then, we present alternative local initiatives which
illustrate new modes of governance involving not only public local
authorities, but also farmers’ bodies and civil society organisations. The
last section discusses the impacts of decentralisation and of diﬀerent
modes of governance on the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of
farmland protection instruments.
2. Conceptual and analytical frameworks
2.1. Farmland conversion: forms and stakeholders
Urban sprawl caused by the conversion of farmland to urban uses
may follow various spatial patterns: from spill-over or leapfrog in dense
urban developments (Yaping, 2009; Altes, 2009) to the low-density
scattering of buildings within agricultural areas (Millward, 2006;
Gosnell et al., 2011). Many driving factors explain these various pat-
terns. Around the Mediterranean for example, Salvati (2013) shows that
urban growth follows a path-dependency process: Rome and Lisbon,
which had a dispersed urban form at the beginning of the 20th Century
have experienced more sprawl than Athens and Barcelona, which had
and still have a more compact form.
In this paper, we refer to various processes of farmland conversion:
- Farmland conversion driven by planning choices. This urbanisation
is legal and produces new residential or commercial districts, fol-
lowing spill-over or leapfrog spatial patterns. New transportation
infrastructures also cause fragmentation of farmland.
- Farmland conversion driven by individuals, for private projects,
leads mainly to the scattering of residential and farm buildings
within agricultural areas.
Since the 1960s, French and Italian governments have tried to
control such long-term trends in farmland conversion, while, at the
same time, the pattern of governance has shifted from predominantly
centralised to more decentralised modes.
2.2. A governance perspective revealing the impacts of decentralisation
We propose to use a conceptual framework based on a governance
perspective to focus not only on formalities (and government institu-
tions) but also on governing behaviours and practices. With Stoker
(1998), we believe that “the value of the governance perspective rests
in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding changing
processes of governing” (p.18). Kjær (2004) pointed out that ‘govern-
ance’ has diﬀerent meanings for the people using it. Most scholars agree
with Stoker that “governance refers to a set of institutions and actors
that are drawn from but also beyond government” (1998, p.18). Since
the 1980s, in a context of public budget reductions, governance has
evoked the stepping back of the state, the limits of government, and the
growing commitment by individuals and civil society to tackling social
and economic issues. This governance perspective “sees the government
as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide” Kjær (2004),
not only command in a top-down approach.
For this paper, we refer to Kooiman’s ‘interactive governance’ fra-
mework (Kooiman, 2003) to analyse the interactions of social and po-
litical actors from state, market and civil society. Based on three types
of interactions (‘interferences’ in primary societal processes, horizontal
‘interplays’, and vertical, formalized ‘interventions’), he distinguishes
three modes of governance: ‘self-governance’, ‘co-governance’ and
‘hierarchical governance’. Moreover, Kooiman’s interactive governance
has three components: images, instruments, and action. ‘Images’ are
visions, knowledge, convictions, ends and goals which guide action,
may or may not be shared among stakeholders, and may or may not be
explicit in public action. ‘Instruments’ link these images to action, to
inﬂuence societal interactions (legal tools, incentives, etc.). A wide
range of instruments is available, and they are not considered a neutral
medium. ‘Action’ is how instruments are put into eﬀect, for instance the
implementation of policies according to set guidelines. These notions
will be useful in our analysis to show the role played by instrumentation
in farmland protection policies.
Decentralisation processes partly explain the shift from government
to governance in France and Italy. According to the World Bank, “de-
centralisation is the transfer of authority and responsibility for public
functions from the central government to intermediate and local gov-
ernments or quasi-independent government organisations and/or the
private sector”.1 Schneider (2003) distinguishes three core dimensions:
‘political’, ‘administrative’ and ‘ﬁscal’ decentralisation.
Decentralisation is generally promoted by international organisa-
tions to provide better opportunities for local stakeholder participation
in decision-making, aiming for more creative, innovative and re-
sponsive programs. However, frequent challenges in implementing
decentralised governance include the potentially reduced eﬃciency of
public action in regions with weaker administrative and technical ca-
pacities, a lack of strategic vision and an increased risk of corruption at
local levels. The literature on land use planning highlights issues of
timescale coordination (Holtslag-Broekhof et al., 2014), vertical co-
ordination between multiple public decision-making levels (Koomen
et al., 2008; Kline et al., 2014, Artmann, 2014), spatial coordination
and balance between rural and urban authorities (Lichtenberg and
Ding, 2008). Stakeholder-based approaches are complex to implement
due to the high number and diversity of stakeholders involved, as well
as their often antagonistic interests (Cormerais-Thomin and Bertrand
2013, Rey-Valette et al., 2014). They even raise issues of procedural
and distributive justice (Kerselaers et al., 2013). That is why we decided
to focus not only on eﬀectiveness but also on social acceptability of
farmland protection instruments and their modes of governance.
2.3. Analytical framework: assessing eﬀectiveness and social acceptability
of modes of governance
Farmland protection policies encompass public acquisition of land,
regulatory approaches (urban growth boundaries, green belts, com-
prehensive zoning), and incentive-based approaches (based on taxation
or on purchase or transfer of development rights) (Bengston et al.,
2004). French and Italian farmland protection policies are characterised
by the pivotal role of land use planning. We will see how decen-
tralisation modiﬁes the way land use planning is implemented, in-
troducing new modes of governance of farmland protection. Our as-
sessment of these various modes of governance will consider two
dimensions: eﬀectiveness and social acceptability.
The notion of eﬀectiveness relates to the outcomes of public policy
relative to its goal. We will thus consider farmland protection instru-
ments as eﬀective (i) if they reduce the rate of farmland conversion –
some urban sprawl is considered unavoidable during economic devel-
opment and population growth periods –, (ii) if agricultural land is still
actively farmed and (iii) if they help meet societal demands for a
multifunctional peri-urban agriculture (Zasada, 2011) providing goods
and services (landscapes, natural risk management, short food supply
chains (SFSC), etc.).
1 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/what.htm.
C. Perrin et al. Land Use Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
The notion of social acceptability encompasses, but is not reduced
to, social acceptance. Working on wind energy projects, Fournis and
Fortin (2017) call social acceptability the “ﬁeld of possibilities opened
by the interplay between society and technology, (…) encompassing
both the diversity of possible paths of socialisation of technology and
the speciﬁc results of a peculiar evaluation of a single wind project
(acceptance/unacceptance)“ (p.14). Social acceptability is thus dy-
namic and socially constructed, taking into account public debates, civil
mobilisation, negotiation and power relationships between stake-
holders. Through this notion of social acceptability, we will study how
farmland protection instruments are perceived and appropriated by
stakeholders, examining whether they generate resentment. Im-
plementing farmland protection instruments can trigger conﬂicts, often
related on the urban fringe to the fact that the value of land – con-
sidered as a commodity on the market for urban development – is
greatly reduced by local governments setting up exclusionary agri-
cultural zoning. As there is no compensation under land use regulations
in France and in Italy, landowners have often opposed local authorities
since the 1970s (Renard, 1980; Cadène, 1990). But over the last 20
years, even more conﬂicts have been linked to place-based collective
eﬀorts to prevent or manage the negative impacts of urbanisation on
agrarian landscapes. For instance, in the Greater Paris Region, Darly
and Torre (2013) emphasize that grassroots initiatives, neighbourhood
committees and NGOs involved in farmland protection movements are
mainly driven by interests related not to agriculture but to the protec-
tion of local amenities. These conﬂicts are obstacles throughout the
implementation of farmland protection instruments.
We will thus consider that an instrument is socially acceptable if (i)
its allocative outcomes are considered as legitimate, complying with
established rules and justiﬁable by reference to shared beliefs
(Beetham, 1991) and if its implementation (ii) does not generate con-
ﬂict or strong resentment and (iii) does not lead to the exclusion/
marginalisation of stakeholders.
3. Local contexts and methods
3.1. Two mediterranean cities experiencing urban sprawl
We examine farmland governance on the urban fringe around two
Mediterranean metropolises: Rome (Italy) and Montpellier (France).
We chose to compare these two cities because both have experienced
strong population growth since the mid-twentieth century (Table 1),
resulting in extensive expansion, mainly toward dispersed morpholo-
gies (Fig. 1) into surrounding rural areas (Abrantes et al., 2010; Salvati
et al., 2012). Thus, the challenge of farmland conversion governance is
strong in both city-regions. Rome and Montpellier also have
socioeconomic similarities: urban growth has been based on residential
and service sectors (especially tourism). Both cities have been very
attractive for migrants from the rest of the country and from other
European and Mediterranean countries. The cities diﬀer in size. Rome is
the capital of Italy and its largest municipality, with 2.8 million in-
habitants. Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole includes the munici-
pality of Montpellier, Francés eighth largest city, and 30 peri-urban
municipalities with a total population of 450,000 inhabitants (Table 1).
Nevertheless, we consider these two urban areas as paradigmatic cases
of long-term socio-ecological interactions between urban growth and
peri-urban agriculture along a population size gradient.
Both regions are representative of Mediterranean farming systems,
with a signiﬁcant shift to peri-urban multifunctional agriculture since
the 1960s. The Montpellier region has a long history of wine produc-
tion. Grape monocropping still occupies most agricultural areas, but
since 1970 the wine industry has experienced repeated crises. Uprooted
vineyards have left space available for the diversiﬁcation of peri-urban
agricultural production (cereals, vegetables) (Perrin et al., 2013). Land
tenure is very fragmented amongst private smallholders.
Since the Roman era, land around Rome (the ‘Agro Romano') has
been considered one of central Italýs most fertile farmlands, with good
soil conditions created by the recurring ﬂoodtides of the river Tiber.
After the Second World War, extensive crops (mainly wheat, olives and
vineyards) outnumbered intensive irrigated crops. Land was mainly
owned by the Catholic church, the State, local authorities and a few
other large private landowners. Signiﬁcant changes over the last two
decades include increased land fragmentation from urban sprawl and
decreasing numbers of farms: urbanisation helped push smallholders
out of production (Cavallo and Marino, 2012).
3.2. Methods: document analysis, participant observation and in-depth
interviews
This paper is based on qualitative methods. Primary data were
collected through document analysis (laws, land-use planning docu-
ments, other policy documents, local newspapers), in-depth interviews
and participant observation.
The ﬁeldwork in Rome was conducted over four months in 2015 for
a Masteŕs thesis (Sini, 2015) and included 37 interviews plus observa-
tion of a 3-day participatory workshop for the implementation of an
agricultural park. The ﬁeldwork in Montpellier was based on more than
100 interviews conducted for a PhD thesis (Nougarèdes, 2013), on
participatory observation of regular meetings and working groups in-
volving government and farmers’ representative bodies from 2004 to
2011 (about once a month), and on several case studies of alternative
local farmland protection initiatives between 2008 and 2015.
Table 1
Population and agriculture characteristics in Rome and in Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole.
Rome municipality Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (31
municipalities)
Population 2 722 400 (2011) 434 100 (2012)
Population growth (last 10 years) 9.6% 13.8%
Total surface, km2 1285 439
Density (inhab/km2) 2120 988
Agricultural area (km2) 433 (2010) 141 (2008)
Decrease in agricultural area −17% (1990–2010) −13.3 (1994–2008)
Number of farms 2656 (2010) 640 (2010)
Types of farms Family farms, 16 ha on average Family farms, 22 ha on average
29% < 1 ha; 23% < 1 ha;
45% within [1–10ha[ 41% within [1–10ha[
18% within [10–49.9ha[ 29% within [10–50ha[
8% > 50 ha 7% > 50 ha
Decrease in number of farms −38.3% (1990–2010) −41% (2000–2010)
Main agricultural products Cereals, grapes, olives, fodder, dairy, vegetables Grapes, cereals, fodder, sheep & goats, vegetables
Land tenure Dual land tenure, big public (State + municipality) and Church estates plus individual
farmers (small farms)
Dominance of small private farmer-owned
properties
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We ﬁrst interviewed government oﬃcials and staﬀ responsible for
the implementation of land use planning at local levels (municipality,
region and province (Italy), or département (France)) and a sample of
farmers representating the local farming systems. Then, through the
document analysis, the participant observation and these ﬁrst inter-
views, we identiﬁed alternative local initiatives aimed at protecting
farmland and conducted further interviews with the largest possible
range of stakeholders representing various interests (farmers, residents,
Fig. 1. Urban sprawl in Rome and around
Montpellier between 1960 and 2000.
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government oﬃcials and staﬀ, farmers’ organisations, NGOs).
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Their purpose was to
understand local stakeholders’ practices and points of view on policies
and local initiatives aﬀecting access to farmland, housing and building
rights in peri-urban agricultural areas. First, the interview elicited their
knowledge of current and past farmland protection policies or local
initiatives. We next focused on their personal opinion of such instru-
ments: objectives (legitimacy), implementation (procedures, inclusion/
exclusion of stakeholders in participation), and consequences (impacts
on farmland conversion, social conﬂicts or personal resentments). The
content of the discourse and the documents was then processed within a
common analytical framework structured around Kooiman’s elements
of governance (images, instruments, actions) and the stakeholders’
perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of farmland
protection instruments.
4. Legal frameworks for farmland protection in France and Italy
In this section, we provide a short overview of legal ‘instruments’ for
farmland protection. In Rome and Montpellier city-regions, local au-
thorities control urbanisation by planning land use within the frame-
work of decentralised governance.
4.1. A progressive decentralisation of land use planning systems
In Italy and in France, the planning system is structured in a hier-
archical pyramid fashion (Table 2), leading to multilevel governance.
Public regulation of urban planning mainly relies on binding zoning
plans drawn up at municipal level. These plans deﬁne urban zones,
zones to be urbanised and zones to be protected (rural zones in Italy,
agricultural and natural zones in France). The municipal councils ap-
prove the plans and mayors sign building permits.
Important diﬀerences between the two countries relate to how
municipalities are controlled. In France, legislative power, supervision
and control are still in the hands of the central State, with increasing
input from intermunicipal authorities (metropolitan level). In Italy, the
State created an initial legislative framework in 1942, but since 1970
has delegated all legislative and executive powers regarding urban and
regional planning to the Regions. Relations between the various deci-
sion-making levels are governed by regional plans.
4.2. Urban planning regulations in agricultural areas have been reinforced
Farmland protection is today considered a public goal: in France
(20102) and in Italy (20163), state governments have committed to
reducing farmland conversion. This goal represents the ‘image’
(Kooiman, 2003) guiding public action. Since the end of the 1990s,
both countries have strengthened protection of agricultural land
through regulatory constraints (Table 3).
In France, since 2000, only buildings essential to (and no longer
merely related to) farming are authorised. In Italy, regulations on
buildings in rural zones used to be based on plot size, with no required
link with agriculture. The 1970 regionalisation resulted in each region
issuing its own planning law, so the criteria governing buildings in rural
zones diﬀer from region to region. In Latium, the region where Rome is
located, since 1999, only farmers can build in rural zones under reg-
ulations that are very similar to the French (Table 3).
However, Italy’s position regarding landscape, architectural and
archaeological stakes adds bureaucratic procedures. Since 2004
(D.L.42), the Landscape Report (Studio di Inserimento Paesistico, SIP in
Latium, diﬀerent names in diﬀerent regions) has been required for a
building permit. This document demonstrates the compatibility of the
project with State law, regional and/or other landscape plans, like re-
gional parks (Scazzosi and Branduini, 2014).
Thus, in both nations, planning regulations have been reinforced in
agricultural zones. The ﬁrst local zoning plans of 1960–70 mainly
framed residential urban developments, but for the last ﬁfteen years,
agricultural buildings have been regulated equally tightly. Evaluation
tools are more sophisticated in Rome (PUA, SIP, building permits) than
in Montpellier (a simple building permit with a landscape section). In
France, the focus is on the size of urbanised agricultural areas and less
on architectural and landscape considerations. These two land use
planning systems correspond to what Kooiman names “hierarchical
governance”, “a top-down style of intervention, expressing itself in
policies and law” (Kooiman et al., 2008: 9).
5. Results
Having presented the legal ‘instruments’ for farmland protection, we
will now focus on local ‘actions’ (Kooiman 2003). The ﬁrst section (5.1.)
describes the challenges involved in implementing these regulations in
agricultural areas under decentralised governance, attempting to ex-
plain a paradox: the persistence of farmland conversion despite re-
inforced planning regulations. The second section (5.2.) presents al-
ternative local initiatives for protecting farmland and maintaining
farming on the urban fringe. We assess the eﬀectiveness and social
acceptability of farmland protection instruments in both sections.
5.1. Local implementation of farmland protection regulations:
decentralisation has lowered the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of a
hierarchical mode of governance
Both in Montpellier and in Rome, decentralisation originally fa-
voured urbanisation of farmland, whether by legal or illegal construc-
tion. However, the response in terms of public action diﬀered: the
French State is striving to regain control, whereas in Italy, the pursuit of
illegal practices may be a reaction to an all-pervading bureaucracy.
Table 2
Role of administrative levels of government in land use planning.
Level of government Italy France
Central State Law of 1942 All laws are national
Regions (20 in Italy/18 in France) Urban and rural planning laws Strategic planning guidelines (general objectives and
orientations)
Strategic planning guidelines (binding regional
coordination plan)
Control of municipal zoning plans
Provinces (110 in Italy)/Départements (101 in
France)
Not a signiﬁcant role in land use planning Interpretation of national laws, control and advice to
municipalities
Metropolitan areas (14 in Italy/15 in France) Strategic planning guidelines Growing role since laws of 1997 and 2014
Intermunicipal master plans
Municipalities (7983 in Italy/35,416 in France) Draw up binding zoning plans Draw up binding zoning plans
2 The law 2010-874 on Modernisation of Agriculture and Fisheries sets the goal of
halving conversion of farmland between 2010 and 2020.
3 The Italian law 2016/2383 on reduction of farmland conversion sets the goal of
halting conversion of agricultural areas between 2016 and 2050
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5.1.1. Frequent revisions of municipal zoning plans and informal building
practices
Formal planning choices have the greatest impact on farmland
conversion. Decentralisation has led both French and Italian munici-
palities to revise zoning plans frequently, enlarging or adjusting
buildable zones to allow for public or private urban developments
(Gibelli and Salzano, 2006). Our investigation shows how such public
practices have impacted social acceptability. In Rome, farmers and re-
sidents interviewed were indignant at the administratiońs practices.
The manager of a farmers’ cooperative denounced the deals with real
estate promoters: “they are the true masters of Rome, because elected
representatives change but developers stay. They are very powerful and
have a great inﬂuence on the administrations”. In Montpellier, a re-
presentative of a farmers’ union deplored “the agricultural zone re-
duction that follows each revision, to allow for tourist projects, infra-
structure works or commercial districts”. As found by Jarrige et al.
(2003), our investigation conﬁrms that this zoning instability favours
real estate speculation on agricultural land, the development of fallows
and withholding by owners, who refuse to sell or rent to farmers,
waiting instead for their plot to become buildable. This instability thus
weakens farmland protection.
The second factor aﬀecting farmland conversion is the behaviour of
landowners. The agricultural zones of both regions show evidence of
the same building practices, on the fringes of legality, by non-farmer
residents and farmers.
Non-farmer residents have built illegally in agricultural zones.
Around Montpellier, ﬁshing and farm sheds or mobile homes have been
transformed into villas without authorisation (Crozat, 2009). In agri-
cultural zones, we discovered both from technical staﬀ at the Départe-
ments and from our analysis of building permits that permits have been
granted to ﬁctional farming projects designed to obtain the permit but
having no economic reality. Local elected oﬃcials told us that these
schemes take advantage of mayorś lack of farming knowledge, of the
pressure owners can exert on mayors and of the State’s inability to
properly enforce regulations in a context of reduced budgets and public
policy reform.
Around Rome, too, many buildings have been constructed without
permits since the 1960s. Informal districts fragment the Agro Romano
(Vallat, 1995). This practice was encouraged both by Italian govern-
ment amnesties for urbanisation infringements in 1985, 1994 and 2003
and by the Piano casa in 2009. Our study shows that such behaviour
continues in agricultural zones. Non-farmer owners regularly build
without authorisation. One interviewee’s construction of two villas was
halted three times by the police and taken to court. To quote a neigh-
bour: “The owner was supposed to destroy everything. But nothing
happens. The price diﬀerential between farmland and buildable plots
explains these illegal building practices. The ﬁne costs more than the
permit, but, after building, the property has a far higher value”. Mu-
nicipalities are supposed to destroy and sanction such buildings, but
they only do so on exceptional occasions, hence losing their legitimacy.
Lastly, farmerś own building activities contribute to urban sprawl.
Around Montpellier, technical staﬀ at the Département told us that
farmers sometimes rent or sell their houses to non-farmers and then
obtain a permit for a new house for themselves. Around Rome, the PUA
(farming business plan) does not always prevent changes of purpose for
buildings. Accommodation for the daughter of a wine maker was pre-
sented in a PUA as farm management oﬃces. According to a municipal
oﬃcial, farmers “obtain authorisation for agricultural buildings and
then develop in them activities not linked to agriculture”. Owners also
pass themselves oﬀ as farmers: “they are members of the farmers’ union
Coldiretti, but in reality they have other activities”. Such free riders
show that all landowners – farmers or not – are aware of farmland’s
urbanisation potential, as a market commodity and not as a production
factor for farming or a natural resource to be protected.
Evasive practices are thus very similar in both countries. They in-
volve the same interplay between local oﬃcials, landowners, economic
actors, prospective homeowners and farmers. They illustrate the diﬃ-
culties local authorities face in enforcing policies intended to protect
agricultural land. These public and private practices skirting the law
not only reduce the eﬀectiveness of farmland protection instruments
but also lead to a loss of legitimacy and social acceptability of planning
regulations.
Faced with this situation, the French State is striving to regain
control; in Italy, lack of control is favouring the pursuit of illegal
practices.
5.1.2. Montpellier: the attempt to restore state control engenders conﬂict
with farmers
In France, the central State, with its strong centralising culture, is
caught in a ‘schizophrenic’ posture.
On the one hand, the central State has attempted to regain control.
It adopted stricter regulations in the national SRU law (2001). Around
Montpellier, during our observation of a series of meetings of a working
group composed of farmers’ unions and Département oﬃces supervising
land use planning, farmers complained that mayors have become very
reluctant to approve any building permits in agricultural zones, even for
farming purposes. They pointed out that these new restrictions are a
barrier to maintaining farming. Thus this sanctuarisation of agricultural
areas, while protecting farmland, has lowered the social acceptability of
farmland protection because it has triggered conﬂicts between State
oﬃces, municipalities and farmers.
On the other hand, within the framework of decentralisation, the
central State is progressively losing direct control over local zoning
plans and building permits, by delegating appraisal and control to
municipalities and intermunicipal bodies. Using document analysis, we
compared the interpretation of regulations between départements and
between municipalities. We observed that in some départements/muni-
cipalities, almost all farmers can build housing provided their farms are
economically viable, while in others, only farmers who have to super-
vise animals or food processing activities can build housing. The
Table 3
Urban planning regulations in agricultural areas and decentralisation of land-use planning systems in France and Italy.
France Italy
Before 1967: unregulated construction in agricultural areas
1967: Loi d’Orientation Foncière – LOF national land law. Only buildings related to
farming are authorised in agricultural zones.
1967: The national Ponte law institutes building permits in rural zones and establishes a
maximum buildable volume of 0.1 m3/m2.
1968: A ministerial decree (DM 1444) restricts the maximum buildable volume in rural
areas to 0.03 m3/m2.
2000: National law on urban solidarity and renewal (loi SRU solidarité et renouvellement
urbains). Only buildings « essential to farming » are authorised in agricultural
zones.
1999: In Latium, regional law LR38 authorises the construction of 0.04 m3/m2 of farm
buildings and 0.01 m3/m2 of private housing. Housing must not exceed 300 sq.m and
must be built on a plot of over one hectare.
The permit requester must have farmer status and demonstrate the economic viability
of the farm and that the buildings are required for the farming activity.
The permit requester must have farmer status and show evidence of a farm utilisation
plan (Piano di Utilizzazione Aziendale), a sort of business plan demonstrating the
economic viability of the farm and that the buildings are required for the farming
activity.
C. Perrin et al. Land Use Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
6
interviews showed that such diﬀering applications of the law anger
farmers and give rise to feelings of injustice. For example, farmers in a
municipality which forbids new construction in the agricultural zone
complained that other farmers in the surrounding municipalities are
still authorised to build for farming purposes. Farmers also complain
that they are considered scapegoats regarding urban sprawl, which they
attribute mainly to residential development. A wine grower located
close to a residential district explains: “It isn’t the farmer who is most
dangerous in terms of scattering. It’s the prospective homeowner who
buys a piece of land with only a small farm shed in poor condition. A
few months later, he’s making major extensions and turning it into a
new house”.
The decentralisation of a hierarchical mode of governance has thus
weakened the social acceptability of farmland protection regulations:
new inequalities in farmers’ access to building rights have reduced the
legitimacy of the ‘image’ of farmland protection, and created resent-
ments, conﬂicts and exclusion.
5.1.3. Rome: inadequate public action encourages continued evasive
practices and conﬂicts
Around Rome, farmers and civil society express a feeling of pow-
erlessness and injustice faced with proliferating regulations, the ad-
ministration’s inability to ensure that they are respected and cases of
preferential treatment. These shortcomings in public action legitimise
continued evasion by landowners.
Citizens above all object to the blank cheques given to certain
people by the administration. They feel that the way their requests for
building are treated depends on their relationships, ﬁnancial resources
and political contacts. A Rome municipal oﬃcial from the heritage
protection department admitted that “the right hand does not know
what the left is doing …because there are interests in not blocking
certain urban projects by means of regulatory constraints”.
Shortcomings in public action are also due to complicated admin-
istrative processes. Obtaining a building permit requires hiring experts
to draw up technical-economic and landscape assessments for the PUA
and the SIP, potentially unaﬀordable for small farmers. The adminis-
trative process is often presented as an obstacle course, and response
time is not compatible with an agricultural project. As stated by a wine
grower: “it takes months, even years, to obtain the go-ahead from
several administrative authorities”.
Administrative delays incite farmers to get around the rules to de-
velop their activities, and legitimise this. One farmer working 130 ha of
cereals and fruit and vegetables south of Rome explained: “I lost more
than three years in procedures, so I gave up. (…) We built everything
we needed for farming” (without a permit). Ten years later, “to reg-
ularise, we presented a project with an extension. Since we had to go
through a regularisation procedure, we decided we might as well do a
good job, and for our children’s sake too”. “And we paid the ﬁne. In the
end, that is all that interests the municipality”. Several owners thus told
us that they had chosen to build without a permit and pay the sub-
sequent ﬁne to obtain regularisation. Some had even informed the
mayor before starting to build without permits.
Thus, in both countries, decentralisation has fostered signiﬁcant
farmland conversion, lowering the eﬀectiveness and the social accept-
ability of a hierarchical governance of farmland protection.
5.2. Alternative local initiatives for protecting farmland and maintaining
farming: towards new modes of governance
The issues raised by the hierarchical mode of governing construc-
tion within agricultural areas have favoured the emergence of new
modes of governance through alternative local initiatives for protecting
farmland and maintaining farming on the urban fringe. We now assess
the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of such initiatives led by the
public sector in Montpellier and boosted by civil society in Rome.
5.2.1. In montpellier, co-governance between local authorities and
representatives of the most powerful farmers improved eﬀectiveness but
not social acceptability
Around Montpellier, public actors have introduced new instruments
to better protect farmland within a new mode of ‘co-governance’.
According to Kooiman et al. (2008), this mode covers a variety of
conﬁgurations in which “societal parties join hands with a common
purpose in mind (…). It implies the use of organised forms of interac-
tions for governing purposes” (p.9), such as communicative govern-
ance, public-private partnerships, networks, regimes and co-manage-
ment. In our case, local authorities co-managed periurban farmland
through horizontal interplays with major farmers’ unions at the dé-
partement, metropolitan and municipal level.
At département level since 2004, the State has created around
Montpellier a working group to discuss with farmers urban planning
issues in agricultural areas. This initiative was extended to all
départements in 2008 and subsequently institutionalised in 2010 under
formal département regulation authorities (CDPENAF,4). In Montpellier,
we noted during our observations that negotiations were dominated by
the wine-growing sector. In an oﬃcial document5 the working group
interpreted the national regulations in their favour: only wine-makers
and livestock farmers are allowed to build housing in agricultural
zones. Representatives of other agricultural sectors, especially fruit and
vegetables, tried unsuccessfully in 2010 to modify the agreement, and
this caused resentment among farmers. A market gardener told us in
2016: “I have the feeling the mayor favours wine growers. Only wine
growers obtain building permits and not the other farmers.” Thus, while
the département working group did help reduce farmland conversion
and strengthen the legitimacy of regulatory constraints among local
authorities and leading farmers’ unions, it excluded some types of
farmers. This did not help peri-urban agriculture move towards multi-
functionality (Table 4).
At metropolitan level, the 2006 master plan framing municipal
zoning (SCOT, Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale) addressed agricultural
areas in a new way, not only as empty spaces awaiting urbanisation.
Farmland protection became a major objective, a decisive argument for
curtailing urban sprawl. The plan clearly outlines the areas for future
urbanisation and agricultural areas are the subject of strict regulatory
constraints to avoid sprawl. The 31 member municipalities were ob-
liged to comply and revise their zoning plans accordingly. The SCOT
reﬂects a hierarchical mode of governance at metropolitan level
(Table 4), imposing the halt in urban sprawl by top-down management.
It was eﬀective in reducing the rate of farmland conversion and was
socially accepted, but it involved very little consultation with the public
and farmers’ organisations.
In 2010, the metropolis created an agricultural park (agripark). It
purchased a former wine estate, aiming to combine agricultural and
forest production, environmental services (protection against natural
risks) and citizens’ recreational activities. Multifunctional agriculture
was intended to enhance the sustainability of the urban project as
stated by the Agenda 21 document (2011). This agripark was eﬀective
in farmland protection (Table 4): it preserved 200 ha from conversion,
it allowed abandoned land to return to cultivation and introduced new
farming systems (two market gardens). However, we show elsewhere
that the lack of public consultation and transparency reduced its le-
gitimacy and excluded potential candidates for tenancy (Jarrige and
Perrin, 2017). This is a case of governance through co-management
having poor social acceptability. Farmers renting land were not selected
in accordance with multifunctional objectives but via a network of
4 Commission départementale de la préservation des espaces naturels, agricoles et
forestiers (département commission for the preservation of natural, agricultural and forest
lands).
5 Groupe de Travail Agriculture et Urbanisme de l'Hérault, 2005. Parcours à la con-
struction agricole, 30 p. Revised in 2011: http://www.herault.gouv.fr/content/download/
7510/41196/ﬁle/ParcoursConstructionAgricole.pdf
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institutional actors: farmers’ organisations, political networks. Unequal
allocation of land and building rights caused resentment among farmers
involved in the project.
At municipal level, ﬁnally, mayors proposed to group new agri-
cultural buildings to avoid their dispersion within agricultural areas.
We showed previously that various formulae were tested in diﬀerent
towns (Nougarèdes, 2015). The principle of grouping was promoted by
the departmental working group, included in the 2006 Montpellier
SCOT and continues to spread throughout the country.
This principle of grouping eﬀectively promotes farmland protection:
it prevents the scattering of farm buildings while maintaining building
rights for farmers. However, around Montpellier, this grouping of farm
buildings was generally implemented under ‘co-governance’ between
local farmers and the municipality. Our interviews reveal that this ‘co-
governance’ raised social equity issues and feelings of injustice both
among farmers who were excluded (new farmers) and non-farmers
struggling to obtain housing. Moreover, in some cases, lack of co-
herence between image (objectives) and action undermined the legiti-
macy of these policies.
5.2.2. In Rome, a move towards self-governance by civil society to promote
multifunctional peri-urban agriculture improved eﬀectiveness and social
acceptability
Around Rome, we present three alternative local initiatives for
protecting farmland and maintaining farming on the urban fringe, re-
presenting various modes of governance: hierarchical, co- and self-
governance (Table 5). While around Montpellier, the initiatives emerge
from negotiations between public actors and the leading farmers’ un-
ions, around Rome they emerge from the mobilisation of civil society
and illustrate the public’s new interest in agriculture.
First, the regulatory protection of the Agro Romano was reinforced
through hierarchical governance. The revision of the capitaĺs zoning
plan led to vast protected environmental areas (Piano delle Certezze
signed in 1997), three agricultural parks and stricter regulatory con-
straints in the Agro Romano (municipal binding zoning plan of 2008).
Several areas designated for future urbanisation (ambiti di riserva) in
agricultural areas were cancelled between 2013 and 2015. These land
use planning policies show a new public will to protect farmland. Like
the SCOT in Montpellier, they strengthened existing farms. However,
several interviewees were concerned about whether the municipality
would be able to enforce public control, avoiding preferential treatment
and illegal building. The new regulatory constraints also triggered some
conﬂicts with developers, even though landowners were compensated
through the transfer of their development rights to other areas.
Nevertheless it represented an improvement in the eﬀectiveness and
social acceptability of farmland protection instruments.
Second, public land (450 ha) was attributed in 2014 by the Rome
municipality and the Latium region to young aspiring farmers, com-
mitted to the environment, social inclusion and recreational uses.
Tenders for projects were organised because of public pressure, in
particular by a co-operative of young unemployed workers during the
municipal elections of 2013 (Di Donato et al., 2016). This allocation of
public land is a mode of co-governance, because of the role played by
this co-operative during the procedure. It was eﬀective, allowing
abandoned land to return to cultivation and contributing to the multi-
functionality of peri-urban agriculture. As for social acceptability, some
non-beneﬁciary farmers criticised the dominance of the co-operative in
deﬁning the selection criteria and thought that some chosen farmers’
proﬁles were not fully consistent with these criteria.
Third, agricultural parks were included in the PRG of 2008 but have
not yet come into being. The case of the Casal del Marmo agricultural
park is almost a mode of self-governance, “situations in which actors
take care of themselves, outside the purview of government” (Kooiman
et al., 2008: 9). It was during public local consultations – urban plan-
ning conferences organised by each Rome district in the autumn of
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project. A participatory workshop organised in 2015 through EU ﬁ-
nancing brought together some ﬁfty people over three days for ﬁeld
visits and thematic round tables. The goal was to foster dialogue be-
tween various interests and to build a common vision, a shared project
for the park (Pellegrino and Marino 2016). These encounters demon-
strated the relevance of the agricultural park as a tool for reconnection
between city and agriculture and for social cohesion. Through this
participatory process involving a large range of stakeholders, the agri-
cultural park gained eﬀectiveness and social acceptability. It not only
avoided the urbanisation of 460 ha and strengthened farming since
2008, but may also promote multifunctional agriculture in line with the
societal needs of city dwellers and the will of the stakeholders. How-
ever, it is not certain that the project as conceived during the workshop
will become reality, in the absence of a speciﬁc budget and dedicated
human resources for activation by the municipality. We see in this case
the limits of self-governance if it depends on public funding.
6. Discussion: ambivalent eﬀects of decentralisation and new
modes of governance on the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability
of farmland protection
Many countries have implemented laws and planning instruments to
preserve farmland on the urban fringe. However, it is diﬃcult to assess
the inﬂuence of individual governance structures, because each is em-
bedded in its local context (Tan et al., 2009). This paper has addressed
this issue by comparing the implementation of farmland protection
instruments in the two city regions of Montpellier and Rome. Our hy-
pothesis was that decentralisation processes have changed ways of
governing, introducing new modes of governance that have had an
impact on the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of farmland pro-
tection. From a governance perspective, our results highlight the
practical issues arising from power devolution and diﬀerent forms of
governance relating to farmland protection on the urban fringe.
Decentralisation ﬁrst fostered signiﬁcant farmland conversion,
lowering the eﬀectiveness and the social acceptability of a hierarchical
governance of farmland protection. We showed that around Rome and
Montpellier, decentralisation has led to multiple decision-making au-
thorities and has increased the complexity of procedures. Hierarchical
governance has thus shown its limits: increased regulatory constraints
have not prevented urban sprawl and scattering on farmland. Our in-
vestigation reveals that this scattering is due to legal and illegal con-
struction by farmers and non-farmer residents, in both cases. This
ﬁnding complements prior studies demonstrating (Madeline, 2006) and
explaining (Perrin, 2015) why farm buildings account for a signiﬁcant
share of farmland conversion in France.
In addition, we showed that the devolution of planning powers to
local authorities has worsened free-rider behaviour, skirting the law
and preferential treatment by the authorities, due to the increased
proximity of decision-makers and applicants for building permits.
Pressure from development interests is even stronger when decision-
making is local. This is a general tendency: Nelson and Moore (1996)
stated that “when left for local implementation, state policies are often
ineﬀectively implemented. The reason is that local oﬃcials are re-
luctant to counter prevailing development patterns or frustrate local
citizens and interest groups” (p.242). They are more inclined to sidestep
the legal framework or state policy goals (Jouve and Vianey, 2012;
Cormerais-Thomin and Bertrand, 2013). French municipalities are at a
disadvantage here, being generally smaller than Italian municipalities
but land use decisions are exposed to manipulation and corruption in
both Montpellier and Rome. Local authorities’ actions are not always
consistent with the national goal (Kooiman’s ‘image’) of farmland
protection. This situation is not speciﬁc to France and Italy. In Israel,
Alfasi et al. (2012) denounce a case-by-case “discretionary-oriented
decision-making, providing for revisions of the land use plans and
subsequently diminishing its eﬃcacy” (p.862). Since the 1980s, farm-
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(Renard, 1980; Schiﬀman, 1983), occasioning pressure on local oﬃcials
by developmental and conservative interests. Zoning decided at local
level appears as a political compromise (Senecal et al., 2001).
Finally, we showed that decentralisation has also increased the
heterogeneity of local implementation: rules now vary, both between
municipalities and between regions (Italy) or départements (France).
This spatial heterogeneity of regulations creates new social inequalities
among farmers and between farmers and non-farmers regarding access
to farmland, housing and building rights. Farmland conversion has thus
persisted despite the stronger regulatory constraints in agricultural
areas, partly because their implementation was poorly accepted and
engendered conﬂicts and feelings of injustice. In Rome particularly,
decentralisation worsened the lack of legitimacy and reliability of
planning policies, and administrative shortcomings legitimised con-
tinued illegal practices. Around Montpellier, the regulatory sanctuar-
isation of some agricultural areas, while better protecting farmland,
gave rise to conﬂicts between State services, municipalities and
farmers. Nor does it guarantee the pursuit of farming and its orientation
towards multifunctional peri-urban agriculture.
These shortcomings in a hierarchical mode of governance within a
decentralised institutional framework have in recent years led to al-
ternative local initiatives and new modes of governance. In this second
stage, decentralisation probably has more potential advantages than
disadvantages. It provides better opportunities for decision-making
participation by local stakeholders. In both cities, decentralisation has
favoured innovations all of which have improved farmland preserva-
tion. Some oﬀer improvements not only in farmland protection
methods but also in methods of maintaining farming on the urban
fringe. Similar instruments were introduced in the two cities: enhanced
planning documents, agricultural parks, allocation of public land to
farmers.
Around Montpellier, consultation over management of construction
within agricultural areas took place in an institutional framework
maintaining a system of ‘co-management’ restricted to negotiations
between State and farmers, conﬁrming what Muller (2000) found at
other decision levels in France. Innovative solutions proposed within
this framework – département working groups, SCOT, agripark,
grouping of farm buildings – all improved the eﬀectiveness of protec-
tion of peri-urban farmland. This form of co-governance also facilitated
control for the State, but it did not address the new societal demands for
multifunctional peri-urban agriculture. Moreover, it improved the so-
cial acceptability of farmland protection only for the stakeholders in-
volved in the negotiations: the leading farmers’ unions and the wine-
growing sector. Local authorities failed to bring in new faces; partici-
pation was not open to all agricultural actors nor to civil society.
Therefore, this form of co-governance generated new social tensions
and inequalities among farmers and between farmers and other re-
sidents, raising issues of social and spatial equity. New modes of gov-
ernance thus do not automatically ensure improved social acceptability
of public policy.
Around Rome, citizen participation is stronger than around
Montpellier. Community or civil society organisations seeking the
preservation of the Agro Romano have lobbied the municipality to re-
inforce regulatory protection of agricultural zones and to promote
multifunctional peri-urban agriculture through the allocation of public
land and agricultural parks. The eﬀectiveness of the attempt at self-
governance we observed – the agricultural park of Casal del Marmo –
still depends on adequate public support. Past shortcomings in reg-
ulatory enforcement and the current lack of funding have so far un-
dermined the reliability of public action. The social acceptability of
such initiatives is boosted by the involvement of citizens under provi-
sions for public consultation or civil society movements. Similar social
movements have been observed around Milan (Branduini and Scazzosi,
2011). A rural renaissance can be observed throughout Italy under the
economic crisis (Poli Editoriale., 2013), emerging from local commu-
nity groups federating within national movements such as Genuino
Clandestino,6 supporting for instance the allocation of public land to
farmers in many regions. Around Rome, we observed that the social
movements which combat large-scale public or private urban projects
planned in agricultural areas bring together diverse interests − re-
sidents protecting their living environment, alternative farmers, citizens
opposed to real estate ‘deals’. This ﬁnding conﬁrms what scholars found
in Canada (Spalling and Wood, 1998), in the USA (Bunce, 1998) or in
Israel (Feitelson, 1999): the coalitions that support farmland protection
are formed by stakeholders of heterogeneous nature.
Through such alternative local initiatives, decentralisation did po-
sitively impact the eﬀectiveness of farmland protection instruments, by
increasing government oﬃcials’ sensitivity and responsiveness to local
needs. In some cases, it also helped to address the multifunctionality of
agriculture beyond the issue of farmland protection. Concerning social
acceptability, decentralisation provides better opportunities for deci-
sion-making participation by local non-public stakeholders, thereby
enhancing the legitimacy of farmland protection instruments. However,
public consultation may also increase conﬂict when some actors are
excluded. Our results thus conﬁrm that stakeholder-based approaches
are complex to implement when they involve numerous, diverse sta-
keholders with conﬂicting interests (Cormerais-Thomin and Bertrand,
2013, Rey-Valette et al., 2014). Participatory governance does not al-
ways foster social acceptability.
Our analytical framework based on eﬀectiveness and social ac-
ceptability has helped us assess diﬀerent modes of governance, and it
revives the long-standing debate on eﬃciency vs. equity in farmland
protection (Jacobs, 1989). It should be used to analyse other local in-
itiatives, to further test and potentially improve its heuristic power. The
deﬁnitions of eﬀectiveness and social acceptability used here come
from the literature. However, it would be interesting to analyse how
local stakeholders themselves deﬁne eﬀectiveness and social accept-
ability related to local initiatives for farmland protection. Such a con-
structivist approach could shed light on the rationales behind decisions
and the barriers to social acceptability, helping to build a local con-
sensus on the goals and the instruments of farmland protection. New
tools for increased public awareness, recruitment and dialogue are
needed if the aim of participation is to include numerous and diverse
stakeholders (Margerum, 2005). A participatory method based on focus
groups was, for instance, used by Kerselaers et al. (2011) to set prio-
rities for agricultural land preservation with local stakeholders.
Kooiman’s governance framework proved helpful here in evaluating
the impact of decentralisation. First, his three notions of ‘image’, ‘in-
struments’ and ‘actions’ were useful to understand the role played by
instrumentation in farmland protection policies. For instance, they
highlighted how the overarching goal of farmland protection was
translated into instruments such as reinforced regulatory constraints
concerning construction in agricultural areas at national and at some
lower levels (depending on local authorities). But this was not always
followed by the expected actions, because of the interplay between
local stakeholders within a decentralised institutional framework.
Second, we used Kooiman’s three major modes of governance to
illustrate the main patterns of evolution from a hierarchical governance
to new modes of governance, closer to co-governance around
Montpellier and to self-governance around Rome. There is, however, a
risk that such a typology may mask the diversity within each type. For
instance, the Casal del Marmo agricultural park was an attempt at,
rather than an illustration of, self-governance. Based on Muller (2000),
we characterised as co-management the co-governance mode restricted
to negotiations between State representatives and farmers around
Montpellier. Kooiman himself (2003) distinguishes a variety of con-
ﬁgurations within each of his three types, especially under co-govern-
ance. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, a more systematic
analysis of the governance structure in alternative initiatives would be
6 http://genuinoclandestino.it/.
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interesting as a further test of Kooiman’s governance framework.
7. Conclusion
Our hypothesis was that decentralisation processes have changed
ways of governing, introducing new modes of governance that have had
an impact on the eﬀectiveness and social acceptability of farmland
protection.
Our results show that decentralisation ﬁrst lowered the eﬀectiveness
and the social acceptability of a hierarchical mode of governance of
farmland protection. This is because multiple decision-making levels
increased the complexity of procedures, because there was spatial
heterogeneity in implementation and because behaviours skirting the
law were reinforced by the proximity between local oﬃcials and
landowners and developers. However, decentralisation also favoured
local alternative initiatives for farmland protection and farming de-
velopment on the urban fringe. New modes of governance emerged,
closer to co-governance around Montpellier and to self-governance
around Rome. These new modes of governance often improved the
eﬀectiveness of farmland protection and introduced new issues into
local debates, centred around ways not only to protect farmland but
also to maintain farming and possibly foster its multifunctionality, in
line with societal demands from city dwellers. The social acceptability
of these new modes of governance varies, depending on who is really
included in the participation process. Only the self-governance mode
could theoretically solve the legitimacy and social acceptability issues
connected with public policies, because civil society actors are in
charge. However, self-governance proved diﬃcult to implement in the
case of the Casal del Marmo agricultural park in Rome. The social ac-
ceptability of public policies implemented through co-governance is
more uncertain, because it depends on negotiations and power re-
lationships between stakeholders.
Our study is limited to comparing how the two city regions of
Montpellier and Rome have implemented farmland protection instru-
ments, encompassing not only the regulatory framework but also al-
ternative initiatives. This comparison allowed us to clarify the am-
bivalent impacts of decentralisation and the overall trend towards new
modes of governance, while underlining the path-dependency related to
each institutional framework. However, each initiative deserves a more
in-depth study of its governance mode. Beyond his three major modes
of governance, Kooiman’s distinction between ‘interferences’ in primary
societal processes, horizontal ‘interplays’, and vertical, formalized ‘in-
terventions’ points to worthwhile directions for further research. It
would also be interesting to consider how local stakeholders themselves
deﬁne eﬀectiveness and social acceptability related to local initiatives
for farmland protection.
There are at least two lessons for planners and policy makers here.
First, our study of alternative local initiatives shows that a successful
participatory approach requires new governance tools for increased
public awareness, recruitment and dialogue to include numerous and
diverse stakeholders. This is a learning process, requiring the training of
the stakeholders or external support. Moreover, considering the speciﬁc
constraints that farmers are facing on urban fringes, farmland protec-
tion will probably not be enough to maintain farming and foster its
multifunctionality without a local market to support farmers’ re-
muneration and preserve the diverse uses of farmland.
Second, our results show that some public supervision is still re-
quired when planning powers are devolved to local authorities, in order
to harmonise local implementation and to combat free-rider behaviour,
skirting the law, and preferential treatment by the authorities. For in-
stance, in France, since 2010, a new regulatory authority (CDPENAF) at
département level has controlled and limited farmland conversion
stemming from local authorities’ decisions. In both countries recently,
more powers have also been given to intermunicipal bodies to enable
them to withstand pressure from individual or group interests. The ef-
fectiveness of such public supervision would, however, require
adequate ﬁnancial resources, even in cases of co- or self-governance.
This is a challenge in a European context of public budget reductions.
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